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As the saying goes, some things are better left unsaid. The truth of this saying is in the 
principle that no word is ever just a word; statements, once made, will produce 
genuine material and interpersonal realities. Words can divide but they can also unite, 
they can wound but also heal. Yet it is equally true that the absence of a word, the 
leaving of something unsaid, can be equally harmful. The absence of the word ‘sorry’ 
from a certain arena of Australian political discourse in the past decade, for example, 
has aggravated a number of existing wounds within Australia’s political and social 
landscapes. While I cannot expound on other examples in more detail here, I would 
like to begin with the speculative claim that, in a general sense at least, Australia’s 
government has in the past ten years ruled by division. I do not deny that the Liberal 
government has been particularly successful in galvanizing its support base, creating 
an appearance of unity and the much trumpeted ‘mandate’ to implement a number of 
reforms. Yet I do suggest that the galvanizing of a specific support base is achieved 
by the implementation of policies and the adoption of rhetoric that are ultimately 
divisive, shoring up the existing support base while further alienating those who do 
not belong to this demographic. While this might present a risky political proposition 
– that a government could profit from widespread disunity – this paper will explore 
the potential for mitigation of such risk by the adoption of a language that functions 
by leaving things unsaid: this is the language of the unstated. The political functions 
of this language are exposed at a limit point, I suggest, in the deployment of a master 
term, ‘unAustralian’, which will be considered in terms of its capacity to foreclose on 
the normative and ethical operations of language. By this I mean that it effectively 
removes the subject of the attribution – the person labelled ‘unAustralian’ – from the 
field of discourse, thereby rendering it impossible for the accused to reply and thus 
seemingly absolving the speaker of any sense of responsibility in a here and now of 
the speech act. 
The word ‘unAustralian’ is of course not of very recent invention and it would 
be a mistake to simply credit the current government with its existence. As Philip 
Smith and Tim Philips (2001) have pointed out in a survey of scholarly work done on 
the history of the word, it has in the past enjoyed substantial currency as a ‘part of a 
broader set of terms used to label non-whites and communists, such as aliens, fifth 
columnists, foreigners or the Yellow Peril’ and was employed at the highest level of 
government under both Stanley Bruce and Joseph Lyons (p. 325). In a less systematic 
fashion, the term appears to have continued to resonate within Allied propaganda in 
the Second World War and in anti-communist rhetoric of the Menzies era, in which it 
‘served primarily as a boundary-maintaining discursive player through which the right 
could allege sedition, subversion and disloyalty’, Smith and Philips surmise (p. 326). 
In this sense, they argue that up until the 1950s the word served a similar purpose to 
the use of ‘unAmerican’ under McCarthyism, yet the Australian context gave a more 
pronounced ‘subordinate racial or ethnic component’ to the word (p. 338). What is 
significant in this history is that for about three decades, the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
the word ‘unAustralian’ appears to have fallen into disuse. It has been revived in the 
press during the mid-1990s, and I think it must be no coincidence that this has been 
the period during which the Howard government came into office and has been able 
to maintain power despite what would seem to be a habit of committing electoral 
suicide with alarming frequency.1  
Smith and Philips note that in the past decade the term has not only been used 
with increasing frequency by politicians; it has also become the subject of inquiry in 
editorials, feature articles, and other sites of public speculation. In 1998, for example, 
Craig McGregor published an article in The Melbourne Age giving consideration to 
the use of the term in recent Australian political rhetoric. Prominent figures such as 
Malcolm Fraser, Pauline Hanson, Donald Horne, and Cheryl Kernot were asked for 
their views on the meaning and application of the term, and the majority expressed 
concern at the term’s potential to operate ‘as a cloak for racism and social exclusion’ 
(Smith and Philips, 2001, p. 326). Smith and Philips note that among those who were 
interviewed, Hanson – then leader of the One Nation Party – was most comfortable 
with the label. Indeed, Hanson is cited by McGregor as saying that thinking about the 
word ‘unAustralian’ is interesting ‘because in many ways an examination of this 
makes it a little easier to grasp who Australians are’ (cited in Schwarz, 2004, p. 214). 
No surprises, then, that the republican academic Horne and the left-leaning politician 
Kernot should voice their suspicions about the label, and that even former Liberal 
Prime Minister Fraser’s ambiguous right-wing liberal humanism lends itself to the 
expression of similar suspicions. It is only in Hanson’s unashamedly xenophobic 
vision of ‘one nation’ that the potential for such labels to define the ‘them’ and ‘us’ of 
Australian identity sits comfortably. 
In the past decade, then, there has been this revival of the label ‘unAustralian’ in 
Australian political and social discourse, accompanied by a sometimes ironic effort in 
the popular press to pin the label down to a clear definition. In fact, Smith and Philips 
present their research precisely as an attempt to fill the void in academic interest in a 
term that had previously gone undefined in any systematic way. They note that at the 
time of writing the term remained absent from The Macquarie Dictionary despite its 
regular use by journalists, politicians and the general populace (p. 325). This situation 
has of course been corrected very recently, with both The Macquarie Dictionary and 
The Australian Oxford Dictionary having included definitions of ‘unAustralian’, the 
latter being given as ‘not in accordance with the characteristics, attitudes, etc. said to 
be typical of the Australian community’ (Moore, 2004, p. 1401). Take particular note 
of this definition, for it highlights something that I shall return to in a moment: the 
label ‘unAustralian’ refers to characteristics that are said to be typical. The wise heads 
of the lexicographers responsible for this definition recognise its highly contingent 
quality in being reliant on what has been said before. As I say, I shall return to this 
point momentarily. For now, the point I wish to make is that interest in the use of the 
label ‘unAustralian’ by both journalists and scholars has predominantly in the past 
decade involved the issue of clarifying the term’s meaning, if only in some cases to 
point out the very obvious fact that those who use the term indiscriminately are using 
a term that is effectively devoid of meaning in any official sense. 
In this paper I intend not to add anything to such discussions on a definition of 
the term. That I am avoiding this task is not because I think it unnecessary. As Smith 
and Philips describe their project, based on the tools developed by Raymond Williams 
for investigating broad structures of meaning through specific meanings of keywords, 
an attempt to identify popular understandings of the term ‘unAustralian’ in the current 
context goes hand in hand with furthering ‘our knowledge of how symbolic processes 
are involved in reproducing relations of inclusion and exclusion in Australian society’ 
(p. 324). Yet I think that it may be equally important to leave this talk of a definition 
of the term to one side, if not least of all because Hanson may have been right when 
she said that an examination of what the term ‘unAustralian’ means also makes it 
easier to identify Australians. This is to say that I begin with a suspicion that 
clarifying what it is that makes somebody ‘unAustralian’ merely strengthens the 
position of the speaker who uses the term. Is this necessarily something that should be 
cause for concern? In some sense, by beginning with this suspicion do I not already 
declare in advance that I am taking a position against those who include the term 
‘unAustralian’ in their arsenal of pejoratives? The answer to this second question is, 
of course, yes. I shall not shrink from the responsibility of declaring my interests 
explicitly, but I will insist that these interests are not simply party political. I maintain 
– as would many of us working in the humanities, I suggest – that this party political 
allegiance is one part of a broader set of commitments that we make in our lives based 
on what we have learned from the great thinkers of the past and from the debates in 
which we are currently embroiled. 
In this sense, I am immediately suspicious of the term ‘unAustralian’ not simply 
because it so obviously belongs to the rhetoric of a conservative nationalism favoured 
by the current federal government. As an academic with a background in philosophy 
and cultural theory, I am suspicious of the term in a far more general sense, because it 
strikes me as being so patently unethical. This would seem to me, at face value, to be 
a self-evident feature of the use of the term ‘unAustralian’ although a little reflexivity 
may be in order here: what is it about the use of the term ‘unAustralian’ that seems so 
self-evidently unethical? Perhaps it is not in fact the term alone – in and of itself – that 
conveys this impression. I suspect that with hindsight I might say that uses of the term 
seem so self-evidently unethical because of the manner in which they are presented. It 
would be fair to say in lieu of more detailed surveys of uses of the term ‘unAustralian’ 
in political discourse and elsewhere that it is invariably used as a form of denigration 
in the third person. In other words, it is said by one person to a second person or via a 
channel of communication to an audience about a third person or group. It is, in this 
sense, tantamount to speaking ill of people behind their backs. 
What I need to spell out in more detail, of course, is why this aspect of the uses 
of the term strikes me as being unethical, rather than simply mean. When I invoke the 
idea that we can judge a speech act in terms of whether it is ethical or unethical, I am 
drawing on a particular field of philosophical inquiry: Ethics. Is this perhaps in itself a 
risky proposition? If our goal is to shed light on discursive processes in the Australian 
political and social context, do we risk obscuring these things on which we shed light 
if we retreat into a highly specialised discourse of our own? This is not a new problem 
but it has certainly gained considerable valence for practitioners of Cultural Studies in 
Australia in the last year, as a result of a public dispute over the call for papers for the 
Everyday Multiculturalism conference. One of the sticking points in this dispute was 
a sense – expressed by journalists and academics – that the terms used by academics 
to promote the study of culture remained opaque to a public readership whose cultural 
practices were the very object of scrutiny. I suggest that this dispute reminded us that 
Australian academics may have long since lost the battle for access to the popular 
imagination: it seems that the general populace are happy to view academics with but 
an air of caution so long as we while away our time in the harmless confines of the 
academy, and our esoteric gazes remain fixed on equally obscure matters of interest; 
as soon as we turn our gazes to Australia and its people, caution gives way to mistrust 
or even disdain. One reason for this, I suggest, is that the idea of ‘Australianness’ has 
developed in the popular imagination alongside a current of anti-intellectualism. Thus 
we confront the not insubstantial issue that it is perhaps most ‘unAustralian’ of us to 
want to scrutinise with an intellectual eye the very idea of the unAustralian. 
With this observation, we already hit upon a second characteristic of the use of 
the term ‘unAustralian’ that leads us to question its ethical status. Not only is it akin 
to smear tactics, it carries the hallmarks of heresy: whosoever shall decry the verdict 
of heresy is guilty of the same. It is this second characteristic, I suggest, that brings us 
closer to understanding why the use of the term is unethical, rather than simply mean, 
for example. To make this point, but with an eye to keeping the discussion as focused 
as possible, I shall refer only to a very specific set of concepts derived from the work 
of Emmanuel Levinas, one of the more influential French philosophers of the second 
half of the Twentieth Century. Levinas spent the last four decades of his life working 
on an examination of the philosophical principles for ethical conduct. Importantly, in 
Levinas’s ethical framework, language is the key to the establishment of any ethical 
relation in the first instance. Language is, in this sense, a contract into which I enter 
with at least one other than myself. This contract is what Levinas considers the key to 
every individual’s responsibility to every individual Other. Responsibility emerges as 
a direct corollary of the principle that the Other is my interlocutor. I talk with, rather 
than talking to the Other. The possibility of response, which is here called a condition 
of respondence, is thus a guarantee of the fundamental alterity of the Other and me – 
our difference at the most basic level of being two distinct and separate individuals – 
but also a demand to address myself to the Other as my interlocutor or correspondent 
in the manner of a here and now of the face-to-face interaction. 
By likening the use of the term ‘unAustralian’ to a verdict of heresy against an 
individual, we can see in some degree the mismatch between this term and Levinas’s 
description of the ethical relation between two individuals dependant on a possibility 
of respondence. The verdict is indisputable, and the possibility of response is already 
closed off by virtue of the fact that response itself is seen as an admission of guilt on 
the same charge. We can take this line of questioning further, however, by drawing on 
two more key terms in Levinas’s ethical framework. For Levinas, language occupies 
two distinct timeframes: saying and the said. Saying is language in the time of being 
in use, whereas the said is language as having-been used. Yet it is important that we 
do not take this distinction to be simply between speaking and speech, for example, 
understood as a difference between a linguistic process and its material content. It is 
not the goal here to privilege speaking as a primary process and to consign the written 
or recorded word to the level of the artefact, somehow secondary and after-the-fact. In 
Levinas’s view of language, all words are encountered after-the-fact to some extent, 
but language understood as the possibility of respondence retains a trace of its saying. 
The distinction here is perhaps best described, then, as that between language that can 
be part of an active dialogue and language that fixes meanings, attributions, identities, 
and states, closing off response. 
This distinction is crucial to understanding how Levinas’s picture of the minimal 
ethical relation between two interlocutors can be expanded upon to account for ethical 
relations within broader demographics, extending to issues of social justice or human 
rights, for example. As Emily Wyschogrod (2002) explains, the distinct timeframes to 
which Levinas refers with the concepts of saying and said are always potentially 
concurrent within any statement, and our responsibility extends to locating pathways 
to dialogue:  
 
Yet saying must find its way into the language that is uttered and written and 
that identifies entities, the language of the said, in order to make thought and 
justice in the social order possible... Saying itself must be thematized, ‘contract 
into thought’, show itself as the subject of a sentence. Together the correlation 
of saying and said manifests the subject-object structure of language. (p. 201) 
 
That the correlation of saying and said is described here as manifesting at the level of 
the structure of language must call into question some of our initial assumptions about 
the ethical status of the term ‘unAustralian’ in its apparent similarities to either smear 
tactics or the verdict of heresy. In the first instance, the idea that the term is unethical 
was in fact an observation that the context in which it is invariably used automatically 
excludes the subject of the accusation from the field of the addressee. In the second 
instance, the verdict of heresy, we can now say that what we find unethical is not so 
much the phrase itself as it is the intentionality we ascribe to the speech act. We may 
point out that the phrase ‘X is unAustralian’ coincides more with Levinas’s account of 
language in the time of the said, but what we are actually dissecting in this respect is 
the form of the proposition ‘X is [attribution]’ in the sense that such statements make 
the truth of what they declare to be true, without recourse. For Levinas, statements of 
this order are not, in and of themselves, unethical since it is fair to say that the whole 
judicial system and other vehicles for maintaining social justice are predicated on the 
need to hand down verdicts of this kind as a viable component of due legal process. 
What we need to do, then, is focus far more closely on the word itself. From this 
most recent set of observations, however, it must by now be clear that it is no longer 
within our power to declare the word itself to be either inherently ethical or unethical. 
A word is rendered as such within the structure of a language that enables the ethical 
relation to emerge, but neither the language itself nor the words which populate it can 
be characterised as wholly ethical or unethical. Nevertheless, by giving more detailed 
attention to the word itself, I suggest we might at least more fully inform claims about 
the ethical status of either the context or the intentionality behind the majority of uses 
of ‘unAustralian’ in the pejorative sense. To shift our focus onto the word itself, it is 
worth our while to reconsider the definitions recently added to dictionaries of English 
in the Australian context. As I noted earlier, The Australian Oxford Dictionary defines 
‘unAustralian’ as being ‘not in accordance with the characteristics, attitudes, etc. said 
to be typical of the Australian community’ and I emphasised the point that this hinges 
on what has been said before. The Macquarie Dictionary definition is somewhat more 
convoluted, including several variations on the theme of not being in accordance with 
what is associated elsewhere with Australian values. In defining these values to which 
the term ‘unAustralian’ is opposed, the qualifier ‘such as honesty, hard work, etc.’ 
(Delbridge, 2001, p. 2035) is used. It is worth noting that the definitions in both the 
Oxford and Macquarie dictionaries rely on the use of the non-specific ‘etc.’ as central 
to their definitions. This failure to be specific is not a weakness in the definition so 
much as an exposure of the slippery quality of the term.  
Furthermore, in place of the stipulation that the characteristics, attitudes, values, 
‘etc.’ in question are ‘said to be typical of the Australian community,’ the Macquarie 
definition states that the notion of Australian-ness to which ‘unAustralian’ is opposed 
is simply ‘implied by the user’ of the latter term. To my way of thinking, this is in fact 
a weakness in the definition, yet I say this with some reservation for reasons that will 
soon become clearer. The apparent weakness of this definition is in what seems to be 
a reliance on circular reasoning: ‘unAustralian’ means the opposite of ‘Australian’ but 
what ‘Australian’ means is implied by the use of the term ‘unAustralian’ – the result 
is a lexicographical black hole. The stronger definition would seem to be the one that 
declares that whatever it is to which the term ‘unAustralian’ will be held to be directly 
opposed should indeed have been previously said. After my comments about Levinas 
and the notion of a distinction between saying and the said, it may be easy to see now 
why I was keen to return to this part of the Oxford definition. I suggest that Levinas’s 
use of the word ‘said’ within the terms of this distinction may be comparable to the 
‘said before’ that I have been using in relation to this definition. What do I mean by 
this? The Oxford definition clearly does not mean that use of the term ‘unAustralian’ 
must always be accompanied by a clarifying statement from the speaker about what 
typically counts as Australian. The phrase ‘said to be typical’ refers to a prior and far 
more general sense of something having been said elsewhere by other people. In this 
sense, the definition gestures toward a fairly well established, relatively coherent and 
contained set of meanings to which the term can be assumed to refer. 
Yet the ‘etc.’ on which both definitions rely rather undermines this sense of the 
‘said before’ being at all well established. In an article by Richard White (1995), a 
survey of the recent history of notions of the ‘typical Australian’ shatters the illusion 
that there is anything that could be said to be coherent or well defined about the 
supposed attributes of a typical Australian. White begins by reminding us that Russell 
Ward’s historicised image of a typical Australian in The Australian Legend was in 
fact a product of Ward’s 1950s. White then goes on to map three ‘contradictory but 
co-existing variations’ into which Ward’s dominant notion had become splintered by 
the 1980s (p. 8). As an ‘object of critique’ the idea of a typical Australian had become 
at best a caricature or at worst a figure of ridicule for a younger generation of literate 
urbanites, and as an ‘object of nostalgia’ the same idea was revered because of its 
increasing irrelevance: White identifies John Williamson’s “True Blue” as perhaps the 
‘most evocative expression’ of this lament for the loss of simpler times, embodied in a 
figure that ‘exists out of everyday time, in the past, in a romanticised outback setting, 
on a Sunday morning’ (p. 9). The third variation to emerge in the 1980s is more 
difficult to reconcile with these two different perspectives on the same largely 
irrelevant figure. In the 1980s, the idea of the typical Australian became highly 
relevant as the basis for several major advertising campaigns, as a key factor in the 
way in which Bob Hawke promoted himself during his rise to power, and as part of 
the rhetoric associated with the rise and fall of the larrikin entrepreneurs. White’s 
analysis of this newly relevant version of the figure of the typical Australian shows us 
that in order to make it relevant these uses of the figure transformed its image but also 
‘to a degree discredited it’ (p. 12). 
Armed with this assessment of the state of play in 1995, it must seem absurd to 
suggest that the term ‘unAustralian’ is defined in use as not being in accordance with 
the characteristics that were said in and around 1995 to be typically Australian. If the 
term ‘unAustralian’ is defined in relation to any understanding of that which is said to 
be typically Australian, then it must do so by skipping one or two generations of the 
notion of the typical Australian and refer directly instead to the figure as it presented 
itself in the 1950s à la Ward’s Australian Legend. I would argue instead that the term 
is not used with reference to any specific and well established prior set of meanings of 
Australianness. In the past decade, as Anja Schwarz (2004) has demonstrated, the 
term ‘unAustralian’ has been marked more by its remarkable elasticity than by any 
adherence to a single core definition: during the Woomera detention centre protests in 
early 2002, the fact that several detainees sewed their lips together in protest at their 
treatment was called ‘unAustralian’ by Howard; the same word was used by Federal 
Workplace Relations Minister Tony Abbott to describe the activists rallying for 
improvements in conditions in the detention camps; and at this time Abbott also gave 
the same label to both supporters of a republic and those who favoured reconciliation 
(Schwarz, 2004, p. 211). Using even the most isolated list of examples such as these, 
we can see that at any single moment in time, circa January 2002, the term could 
potentially extend to just about anybody. In Schwarz’s analysis, there is a goal to 
identify a certain type of speaker and target that could be said to be more likely than 
any other to use or to be labelled ‘unAustralian’, and to this end she concludes that for 
the most part only those with ‘a high number of desired national traits’ could possess 
such a ‘governmental belonging’ to Australia as to be able to use the term, but also 
that a certain amount of national capital is needed in order to qualify as potentially un-
Australian (p. 216). 
Yet this general picture of the typical speaker and subject of the use of the term 
as both being able to identify as typically Australian is undermined to some extent by 
the initial snapshot of the range of uses of the term in circulation in January 2002. The 
more useful trend that we might identify here is that the term seems in all cases to be 
an expression of a desire to be identified with authority on a national level to declare 
cases of non-Australianness where they present in any guise. In this respect I think 
Schwarz accounts for Howard’s own persistent use of the term more accurately: when 
he characterises those who contradict the position of his government as unAustralian, 
‘he aims to transform the governmental position into the definition of Australianness 
itself’ (p. 260). For this reason, I may suggest that the weak Macquarie definition – 
using the phrase ‘implied by the user’ – in spite of its lexicographical shortcomings, 
might well be a more viable description of how the term functions if not of what it 
supposedly means. The Australianness implied by the user of the term ‘unAustralian’ 
is intended only to be congruent with the speaker rather than with some external a 
priori ideal. The term is rendered so versatile by virtue of the fact that it is not bound 
to any previously agreed definition of the term which it negates. The meaning of the 
term ‘unAustralian’ is ultimately that it has no meaning and, in so far as it conceals 
this fact of its own emptiness, its function is thus nothing more than to credential the 
speaker as its opposite.  
We arrive, then, at a point on which it might be worth hanging a conclusion: the 
term ‘unAustralian’ does not, strictly speaking, adhere to the normal rules of language 
that are seen, for example, by Levinas, to be the cornerstone of the ethical relation. It 
is devoid of meaning to the extent that the anchoring lexical items in the statement ‘X 
is unAustralian’ are in fact excluded from the universe of meanings it calls upon to 
convey its sufficiency as a statement. Let us be clear what I mean by this. In effect, in 
saying ‘X is unAustralian’ the speaker is really saying ‘I am Australian’ for all intents 
and purposes, and to the exclusion of both the person or group named as X and a clear 
and finite definition of the term for which ‘unAustralian’ is the negative form. This is 
why I have decided to refer to such a statement in the negative, as an unstatement. Its 
sufficiency as a statement ultimately only resides in what it does not, indeed must not, 
say. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the term exists in any sense that would prove 
meaningful within an ethical framework of the kind we have been considering here. It 
is, in a purely Levinasian sense, always untimely, since it belongs neither to the time 
of saying nor the time of the said: it is outside the time of saying because it rejects in 
advance any possibility of respondence, excluding the subject of attribution from the 
discursive field it creates; and it fails to even coincide with the time of the said since it 
presents the attribution only as the negative of an empty signifier. 
If we say that the term is unethical, then, we do so only with a qualification that 
it is a term that simply cannot be accommodated within an ethical framework. Thus it 
can equally be said that by using the term the speaker is absolved of any responsibility 
but that this is by subterfuge rather than an act of good conscience. What I think may 
be capable of being demonstrated by more detailed analysis of the political rhetoric of 
the past ten years is that this one unstatement which lends itself to infinite reiteration 
may well be the master term around which an entire rhetorical empire – the language 
of the unstated – has been constructed. Again, I do not think that we must see such an 
edifice as necessarily having been systematically and consciously developed from the 
ground up by the conservative parties in the last years of Labor rule in the 1990s. It is 
sufficient to observe – as Craig McGregor did in his 1998 article – that the resurgence 
of a term like ‘unAustralian’ is indicative of a more widespread social fragmentation: 
‘It’s a sign, perhaps, of the deepening divisions in our society that it is used, and by 
people from all parts of the social and political spectrum. When a nation’s social 
cohesion is threatened, the calls for some sort of national unity grow stronger’ (cited 
in Schwarz, 2004, p. 214). Deep social divisions generate a language of division. The 
success of the Howard government has in part been the success of a program of 
harnessing this language of division and attaching it to the issue of national identity 
rather than to a rhetoric of unity. The important point here is that the divisions 
imagined at the heart of the matter are many, hence the idea of an increasingly 
fragmented society rather than one nation simply divided in two by a single rift. The 
master term ‘unAustralian’ enables the speaker to contain the nation’s many smaller 
divisions within the terms of a single master division which is not, strictly speaking, a 
rift between sections of the Australian community; it is, rather, the separation of 
Australia from the enemy within.  
Using the example with which I began this paper, we may begin to expand out 
from this analysis of the term ‘unAustralian’ to see how a language of the unstated is 
at work in specific areas of concern for the government. Penny Rossiter (2002) has 
described this federal government’s refusal to say ‘sorry’ to Australia’s indigenous 
population as an insistence on ‘the irredeemable character of the past’ (p. 92). Yet 
Rossiter draws on the work of Ien Ang, Moira Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd, and others to 
also show that the path to reconciliation is difficult to imagine in real terms in the 
present, no matter how much we may declare a shared commitment to collective 
responsibility. The difficulties Rossiter presents are only partly associated with the 
government’s direct attempts to thwart the many programs for reconciliation. The 
greater difficulties are associated with the complex differences between cultures such 
that even the idea of dialogue can mean different things to each of the groups trying to 
create dialogue. Where dialogue breaks down, a government that seeks to rule by 
division need not become involved to any great extent, since division already exists. 
Most importantly, they should not be seen to present an affirmative position. Instead 
of the collective statement, ‘We are sorry,’ or better, an individual expression of 
apology – ‘I am sorry’ – the government’s position is constituted by what it will not 
say. How does this relate to my claims that the term ‘unAustralian’ functions as a 
master term within the language of the unstated? We see this in operation at just such 
moments where a government adopts the position of not saying something, that is, 
where a division that suits the government’s agenda already exists. In lieu of saying 
anything, the government can fall back onto a master term of unstatement, and so it is 
that proponents of reconciliation are on occasion labelled as ‘unAustralian’ for their 
insistence that we recognise this past that the government deems to be irredeemable. 
In lieu of ‘I am sorry’ we find only ‘X is unAustralian’ (which we know now to be 
code for ‘I am Australian and X does not belong’). The division is secured, yet the 
speaker comes out, if not perhaps on top, at least standing tall, to one side, at a safe 
distance from the point of impact of social divisions. This is of course no ethical 
standpoint at all, but it is a standpoint nevertheless, and one that has for the past 
decade proven to be highly effective in dodging electoral bullets. 
 Notes 
 
1. In a public lecture of 7 December 2006, Klaus Neumann indicates that the records 
of speeches in federal parliament dating back two decades include some 600 uses of 
the term ‘unAustralian’ of which almost half were in speeches prior to 1996. We may 
account for the apparent discrepancy between Neumann’s research and the work of 
Smith and Phillips, I think, by concluding that what the latter identify is a resurgence 
of the use of the term in the press by politicians and journalists, whereas the former 
identifies a continued use of the term within the confines of parliament for some years 
prior to its resurgence in the public sphere.  
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